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Abstract The mechanistic approach in philosophy of science contributes to our under-
standing of experimental design. Applying the mechanistic approach to experimentation
in computing is beneficial for two reasons. It connects the methodology of experimen-
tation in computing with the methodology of experimentation in established sciences,
thereby strengthening the scientific reputability of computing and the quality of exper-
imental design therein. Furthermore, it pinpoints the idiosyncrasies of experimentation
in computing: computing deals closely with both natural and engineered mechanisms.
Better understanding of the idiosyncrasies, which manifest in terms of a nonstandard
role for experimentation, are interesting both for computer scientists and for philoso-
phers of science. Computer scientists can think more clearly about their experimental
choices. The role of experimentation elucidated by computer science merits further
study from philosophers of science generally, as it highlights a role for experimentation
hitherto unrecognized by philosophers: demonstration that activities exist.
Keywords Computing . Experiments .Mechanisms . Experimental method
1 Introduction
This note is largely a rejoinder to a particular portion of the work by Viola Schiaffonati
and Mario Verdicchio recently published in this journal (Schiaffonati and Verdicchio
2013). They address the status of experimentation in computing, concluding (in part)
that “calling for experiments in computing does not equate with making computing
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more similar, at least from a methodological point of view, to traditional scientific
disciplines” (Schiaffonati and Verdicchio 2013, p. 15). Here, we dispute that claim:
experimentation in computing can benefit from making strides toward similarity with
traditional scientific disciplines. Such an attitude—when warranted—reveals both a
positive direction for the status of experimentation in computing and a new role for
experimentation for philosophers of science to consider.
Building upon the work done by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, we argue that
experimenters in computing should adopt the mechanistic approach that has gained
favor in the philosophy of science literature. 1 Doing so, we claim, reveals that
experimentation in computing breaks into two categories. The first, which deals with
the natural operations of systems, is a straightforwardly physical endeavor. 2 The
mechanisms under investigation in experiments of this type are labeled physical
mechanisms. Such experiments are likened to mechanistic experimentation in biology.
Experimentation of the second type, which deals with the generation of artifacts, the
interaction between systems, or human exploitation of an artifact or system, is inti-
mately tied to engineering endeavors. Thus, the second category deals with the
engineered operations of systems. The mechanisms under investigation in experiments
of this type are labeled engineered mechanisms.
In Section 2, the progress made by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio is presented. The
aim is elucidation of common ground for further analysis in the subsequent sections. In
Section 3, it is argued that experimentation on physical mechanisms in computing bears
resemblance to mechanistic experimentation in biology.3 Thus, in contrast to the urging
of Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, experimentation of this type in computing does warrant
comparison to (and should strive for similarity with) the methodology of a traditional
scientific discipline. Section 4 introduces Allan Franklin’s classification of the roles of
experimentation in science. Franklin’s work is included to substantiate the claim that
experimentation on engineered mechanisms in computing introduces a role for
experimentation that is worthy of extended analysis by philosophers of science.
Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
2 Bisecting the Role of Experimentation in Computing
Schiaffonati and Verdicchio contribute to our understanding of the role of experimen-
tation in computing. 4 In particular, their work highlights an important feature of
computing: it has an intrinsic engineering component. Ignoring the engineering
1 In Sect. 2, we will provide the necessary details and definitions from the mechanistic approach. Furnishing a
complete account of the emergence of the contemporary mechanistic approach in the philosophy of science
literature is beyond the scope of this paper. One good starting point for undertaking that endeavor is the entry
on mechanisms (and the references contained therein) in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science
(Glennan 2014).
2 Examples might include the electrical conductivity of a material or the way that the human eye perceives
changes to shapes on a screen.
3 In maintaining the mechanistic approach, an underlying assumption is that human psychological factors are
rooted in physical mechanisms. See the keystroke study reported in Killourhy and Maxion (2009) for an
example of the interplay between computing and psychological states as physical mechanisms.
4 “Computing” is used broadly; as Schiaffonati and Verdicchio note, the term is nebulous. We will implement
it with the same intended denotation as it is used in their article. See pp. 2–4 of their work for details.
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component can, in some cases, generate discord when one attempts to liken experi-
mentation in computing to experimentation in the established sciences:
The proposals that are endowed with a discussion on concrete examples show
that the application of general experimental principles is not straightforward and
immediate, and reveal that differences with traditional sciences are not due only
to the relatively young age of computing, but also to its intrinsically different
disciplinary nature, scientific and, at the same time, engineering. (Schiaffonati
and Verdicchio 2013, p. 14)
According to this account, properly noting the engineering component of computing
amounts to being aware that experiments involving it have “the goal of demonstrating
that a given artifact is working in some way or that it is better than another. […]
Experiments about artifacts in computing tell us more about the people that have done
the job, than the way the world is” (Schiaffonati and Verdicchio 2013, pp. 14–15).
Schiaffonati and Verdicchio argue against proposals that aim to overhaul experimental
practice in computing through conforming to experimental practice in the established
sciences. They reason that properly accounting for the engineering influence in com-
puting makes conformity with the experimental practices of the established sciences
misguided.
The distinction is important, but it stands in need of refinement. Clearly
Schiaffonati and Verdicchio do not intend to imply that engineering cannot learn
from science, nor that science has no place informing engineering decisions.
However, the claim that an engineering discipline should eschew the experimental
methods of traditional science appears to imply exactly that. Schiaffonati and
Verdicchio themselves recognize that further development is needed, as they close
their paper by noting that the results “call for a rethinking” and that they have
“singled out some open issues” (Schiaffonati and Verdicchio 2013, pp. 15–16). The
following is meant to initiate the refining process.
Philosophers of science have contributed substantially to our understanding of
scientific methodology. Of particular importance for the present work is the
mechanistic account. Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver co-
authored a seminal paper on mechanisms in 2000.5 In it, the components of a
mechanism are identified as entities and activities, and mechanisms themselves are
defined accordingly: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that
they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3). For this project, we will adopt that
definition. This ontological framework offers the potential for conceptual clarity
regarding the role of experimentation in computing: successful experimentation on
this account would amount to progress toward understanding how the mechanism
in question works.6
5 As Glennan notes, “Machamer et al. (2000) is the most widely cited paper on mechanisms” (Glennan 2014,
p. 428). Accordingly, in what follows, we will rely predominantly on that article as representative of the
mechanistic approach.
6 For a related discussion involving a mechanistic account of computation, see especially Piccinini (2007).
Other discussions involving accounts of computation include Piccinini and Scarantino (2011), Fresco (2013),
Scheutz (1999), Copeland (1996), and Fresco and Wolf (2013).
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The regular operation of a mechanism is one of its indispensable features:
Mechanisms are regular in that they work always or for the most part in the same
way under the same conditions. The regularity is exhibited in the typical way that
the mechanism runs from beginning to end; what makes it regular is the produc-
tive continuity between stages. Complete descriptions of mechanisms exhibit
productive continuity without gaps from the set up to termination conditions.
Productive continuities are what make the connections between stages intelligi-
ble. If a mechanism is represented schematically by A→B→C, then the conti-
nuity lies in the arrows and their explication is in terms of the activities that the
arrows represent. A missing arrow, namely, the inability to specify an activity,
leaves an explanatory gap in the productive continuity of the mechanism.
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3, emphasis in original)
Exploiting this attitude with respect to experimentation in computing has potentially
large payoffs for the quality of work and general scientific respectability of the field.7
Systems in computing are mechanisms, so an experimental approach designed to
explicate the system (mechanism) at hand results in clarity, reproducibility, and trans-
ferability of results.8
Whereas Schiaffonati and Verdicchio advocate a conceptual dualism in computing
comprised of its “scientific” and “engineering” components, a more fruitful approach is
to split experimentation in computing into physical and engineered categories, accord-
ing to whether the mechanism of the system under exploration is natural (physical) or
artificial (engineered). The switch is not merely semantic. Instead, it removes the
insinuation that the “engineering” and “scientific” features of computing are distinct
from each other. Rather, computing as a discipline exhibits scientific potential, and that
potential can approach realization through experimentation dealing with either a
computing system’s physical facet or its engineered facet.9
For an intuitive heuristic to make the distinction, one may use the “speed” at which
the mechanism in question changes. Physical mechanisms change at geological (or
perhaps even cosmological) speed: the entities and activities operate identically for long
stretches of time. Long-term changes may occur in the mechanism’s operation, but
those changes take significant time. For example, the reproductive mechanism of a
certain species may gradually evolve through natural selection, but for generations-long
stretches of time it remains the same. And the fundamental physical forces (such as the
electromagnetic force) may never change, or may change so slowly that their values
can be assumed fixed. Natural physical mechanisms always operate the same during the
time involved in any computing research project.
7 By “scientific respectability,” we refer loosely to the longstanding debate discussed at length by Schiaffonati
and Verdicchio in the opening to their paper. For evidence that the scientific respectability of computing is in
need of improvement, see (for example) the references provided in footnote 31 below.
8 Further argumentation for the claim that systems in computing are mechanisms is presented in Sect. 3.
9 A discourse on precisely what qualities are necessary for a discipline to exhibit in order for it to count as
scientific would take us too far afield. We will assume that experimentation is a necessary feature of a scientific
discipline. Accordingly, to the extent that the quality of experimentation in computing is subpar, so too will its
scientific status remain subpar. Additionally, an interesting case that warrants study beyond the present work is
emergent behavior. It is not obvious whether either class (physical or engineered) fits scientific experimen-
tation on emergent behavior.
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Engineered mechanisms, on the other hand, change at “human” speed: the operation
of the entities and activities might change very quickly. Internet governance standards
may be developed and deployed, for example, that directly and immediately impact the
operation of a computing mechanism with respect to security or privacy. And the
mechanism involved in a network connection changes rapidly as the users of the
connection impart changes to it. Engineered mechanisms are vulnerable to rapid
changes in the way that their entities and activities operate, whereas physical mecha-
nisms are not vulnerable to the same sort of change.
This is not to say that a system involving a physical mechanism does not exhibit
change. Activities, a key element of a mechanism, are “the producers of change”
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3). The growth or disease of an organism is a change, and
each type of disease, for example, has its own mechanism, but the mechanism by
which any particular disease type makes any particular type of organism ill does not
change over the course of investigation. Bacteria and viruses are also known to
evolve quickly—perhaps even at “human” speed—but the mechanism of evolution
does not change, nor does the mechanism of protein transcription or the action of
the new proteins within the cell. New entities, perhaps in the form of genetic
material and proteins, are introduced, but the mechanism remains coherent, and
the activities largely remain the same in physical systems.
A more refined definition of engineered mechanisms captures both the intuition of
quick mechanism change and the possible conflation with speedy elements of the
physical world: engineered mechanisms are susceptible to having their entities or their
activities changed during the course of the investigation at the will of a rational
decision-making entity. Physical mechanisms do not have this property.
Such a distinction makes possible a consistent viewpoint on experimentation in
computing that accounts for the claims of Schiaffonati and Verdicchio. Whereas they
characterize the “engineering” component as inherently present in all computing
experiments, this need not be the case.10 Many experiments in computing isolate only
a physical mechanism within a system.11 Though many artifacts are designed to take
advantage of certain physical mechanisms, care is necessary for proper classification.
For example, merely the fact that humans can build a spring does not mean that the
spring constant or the model for forces exerted by a spring have been built as well;
those are physical mechanisms (or representations of physical mechanisms) to which
the artifact is subject. The same holds true for computers. Transmitters or human-facing
displays (for example) may be artifacts that take advantage of, or are optimized for, a
particular physical mechanism. Experimentation likely is helpful in determining which
10 See Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, p. 14, for their insinuation that the engineering component of computing
resonates throughout experimentation in computing: “We claim that the engineering component of computing
should be considered when reflecting on the nature and role of experiments in computing.” This suggests that
the “engineering” component is omnipresent in computing, and therefore that it warrants consideration in all
computing experiments.
11 One example is determining a transmission channel’s signal-to-noise ratio. Shannon’s work on this problem
is fundamental to computing. However, the SNR bounds are independent of any device. Another example is
determining the psychological parameters of human–computer interaction (HCI) such as fighter pilot situa-
tional awareness based on varying the computer’s heads-up display (HUD) design. In this case, the mechanism
in question really relates to how the human brain processes information, which is not an engineered
mechanism.
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mechanisms are relevant and in measuring their effects. Clearly distinguishing these
possible confounding situations should improve experimental design in computing.
Furthermore, the outlined distinction nicely situates computing within the landscape
of science. Every scientific discipline shares with the others a grounding in physical
phenomena. Even still, lest they be the same discipline, a necessary distinction likewise
exists between any pair of sciences. For computing, the grounding in physical phe-
nomena comes through experimentation that demonstrates the physical operation of
systems and the psychological aspects of human computer users. However, its distinc-
tion from other sciences emerges from its engineered facet. It is in this context that the
argumentation provided by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio rings true. However, they have
overstated the distinction by implying that this fact means that computing could not
improve its experimental methodology by learning from other sciences.12
Its distinction—the engineered facet—provides computing with its own scientific
territory. For example, life (broadly construed) stands as the distinguishing feature of
biology, and consciousness (broadly construed) stands as the distinguishing feature of
psychology.13 Each of those scientific disciplines admits of experimentation involving
the physical phenomena under its purview, but it also admits of experimentation
involving its “distinguishing feature”—essentially, the reason why it is useful to call
the field of study by its own name.
Computing further subdivides into myriad specialized factions, just as biology and
psychology each admit of many specialized subfields of study. Cybersecurity, for
example, focuses on the interplay of criminology, cryptography, economics, and
computing. Experimentation in cybersecurity thus can and should emphasize one of
two main subjects: physical phenomena and engineered phenomena. Physical phenom-
ena involved in cybersecurity research include, for example, electromagnetic interfer-
ence with communication channels (active jamming (Shenghua et al. 2004), passive
jamming (Reade et al. 2007), or EMP disruption (St. Sauver 2009)) or the consistency
of human keystroke typing patterns used for biometric identification (Killourhy and
Maxion 2009). Engineered phenomena involved in cybersecurity research include, for
example, socially interactive deception based on website design choices (Dhamija et al.
2006) or DNS cache poisoning attacks due to UDP port number or Query ID selection
algorithms (Friedl 2008).
In both physical and engineered cases, these mechanistic descriptions would involve
products that are the result of engineering—keyboards, for example. However, the
question of whether or not humans type differently from each other, given a keyboard,
is not subject to mechanistic change during the course of investigation. A particular
cache poisoning attack script also uses products of engineering, but the mechanism
under study is itself engineered, and it is changeable. The crucial distinction is not
whether products of human engineering are utilized in the inquiry, but whether the
mechanism under investigation has been engineered. For a mechanism to be
engineered, the entities and the activities involved in the mechanism must be
engineered.
12 See once more the quote from Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, p. 15, for evidence: “[W]e hope to have made
clear that calling for experiments in computing does not equate with making computing more similar, at least
from a methodological point of view, to traditional scientific disciplines.”
13 By “distinguishing feature,” we mean that particular focus that separates biology (for example) from
chemistry (again, for example).
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The following extended example is intended to illustrate the qualities of engineered
mechanisms. An experimenter is presented with an odd-looking calculator with only 5
buttons: “1,” “2,” “+,” “−,” and “ENTER”. Reminiscent of an oddity one might find in
one of Andy Warhol’s time capsules, let us name the device “Warhol’s Calculator.”
Warhol’s Calculator is designed so that each button, when pressed, relays the contents
of a digital storage element (e.g., a file or register) to a cache, and when ENTER is
pressed the calculator displays the results. The calculation mechanism embodied by the
calculator works with entities {1, 2} and activities {addition, subtraction}. While
Warhol’s Calculator, the device, appears to be the product of human engineering, this
does not directly bear on whether we call the mechanism engineered.
To determine whether the mechanism is engineered, we must determine whether the
entities and activities of the mechanism can be changed by rational agents. Imagine that
the user of Warhol’s Calculator presses 1+1ENTER and the display reads “2,” as
expected. The user repeats one second later, and the display reads “4.” The user repeats
again one second later, and the display reads “0.”What the user does not know is that
the calculator’s entities and activities are being changed, altering the mechanism that
executes before the display. When the user presses 1, Warhol’s Calculator sends the
contents of the file associated with this button. But Warhol’s Calculator is designed to
swap the contents of the files associated with the buttons “1” and “2” every second. The
activities also change: the algorithm associated with “+” is swapped with that associ-
ated with “−” every two seconds. So, in the first iteration, Warhol’s Calculator
calculates 1+1, but then 2+2, and, in the third iteration, 1−1.
In the natural sciences, where physical mechanisms are under investigation, the
entities and activities cannot be so manipulated. For example, using artificial selection,
humans can breed very odd-looking birds. Though we may alter certain entities
(perhaps which pigeons are allowed to breed), the entities and activities of the under-
lying, finer-grained mechanism of chromosome replication during meiosis cannot be
altered by the rational agent.
Warhol’s Calculator, an engineered mechanism, is different. The entities and
activities are changeable by a rational agent. The original instantiation involved
each entity alternating every second and each activity alternating every 2 s, but this
itself was a design choice by a rational agent. Warhol himself may be sitting behind
the experimenter with a toggle switch, alternating the entities and activities of the
mechanism at his discretion. This makes the experimenter’s job practically much
more difficult: she must design experiments to account for changeable, engineered
mechanisms. This is the essential importance of designating mechanisms as phys-
ical or engineered: engineered mechanisms are different from physical mechanisms
owing to their susceptibility to be changed by a rational agent. Accordingly,
experimental design for the investigation of engineered mechanisms may be fun-
damentally different from experimental design for the investigation of physical
mechanisms.
Given the distinctness of physical and engineered mechanisms and the development
of contemporary science into extremely fine-grained areas of specialization, any given
scientific experiment performed in computing should be classifiable exclusively as a
physical computing experiment or as an engineered computing experiment. An exper-
iment that dabbles in both areas almost certainly is too coarse-grained for its results to
be qualified as scientific. Such an experiment, by virtue of testing both physical and
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engineered facets, would necessarily involve a degree of freedom in both domains,
thereby casting doubt on the scientific integrity (specifically, the internal validity) of its
results.
The urging by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio to view computing as inherently involv-
ing engineering is fruitful. However, deeper clarity is afforded by noting, first, the
foregoing distinction between engineering and engineered, and second, that any
specific scientific experiment in computing should target either a physical mechanism
within a system or an engineered mechanism within a system.14 The following two
sections aim to identify some of the implications of viewing experimentation in
computing in these terms. A mechanistic approach to experimentation in computing
reveals that computing can benefit from emulating the methodology of an established
science, especially when the experimentation targets a physical mechanism within a
system.15 Furthermore, philosophers of science can benefit from studying experimen-
tation in computing, particularly experimentation on engineered mechanisms.16
3 Experimentation on Physical Mechanisms in Computing
Experiments in computing that isolate physical mechanisms stand to benefit from
adopting the outlook of traditional sciences toward experimentation. This claim will
be supported first by likening physical systems in computing to mechanisms in
experimental biology. Then, after extracting a set of desiderata from experimental
biology, we see how adopting those desiderata would benefit at least one subdiscipline
of computing, namely cybersecurity. This approach, though subject to the known
limitations of case studies, will nonetheless provide initial support for the claim that
computing experiments that isolate a physical mechanism could benefit from adopting
the methodology employed in established sciences.
3.1 Case Study: Biology
The mechanistic ontology, composed of entities and activities, has contributed clarity to
our understanding of physical experimentation. For example, the flexibility for mech-
anisms to be descriptively coarse-grained or fine-grained is a virtue. Machamer,
Darden, and Craver write:
Scientists do not always provide complete descriptions of mechanisms at all
levels in a nested hierarchy. Also, they are typically interested in types of
14 Importantly, this claim is meant to apply to good experiments in computing. As will be seen, the literature is
rife with examples of bad experimentation, and often what makes those experiments bad is a failure to identify
a single experimental mechanism.
15 It is important to note that computing experiments that target engineered mechanisms often stand to gain
from employing the methodology of established sciences as well. However, the benefit is most clearly
exemplified for physical mechanisms, as will be seen.
16 Identifying the distinction between physical mechanisms and engineered mechanisms in computing is a task
separate from determining the individual roles played by physical and engineered mechanisms in computing
(and perhaps their interaction with each other in a joint role). Our task in Sect. 2 has been the former; we view
that step as one that is necessary to complete before the latter can be attempted. A separate piece of substantial
research will be necessary before progress on the latter step can be made.
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mechanisms, not all the details needed to describe a specific instance of a
mechanism…[Schema terms] may be characterized as activities in higher-level
mechanisms. (Machamer et al. 2000, pp. 15–16)17
The “nesting” feature of mechanisms is important. It unites experimentation at
different levels of granularity. Since the mechanistic approach takes phenomena to be
exhibitions of the operations of mechanisms, experimental inquiry amounts to inves-
tigation of the mechanism(s) that produce(s) the phenomenon in question. The nesting
feature of mechanisms thereby solves a problem described by Radder:
Since scientific practice does not consist of isolated experiments performed by
solitary experimenters, we have to examine the ways in which individual exper-
iments are embedded and used in broader experimental and theoretical contexts.
(Radder 2003, p. 153).
The mechanistic approach accommodates the embedding. A coarse-grained mechanism
is comprised of finer-grained mechanisms. Experimentation can occur at any level of
granularity by designing the experiment to isolate the entity or activity in question at
the grain size appropriate to the scope of inquiry.
In the computing context, this is particularly germane because systems in computing
admit of precisely this feature of varying granularity. A network of computers is a
system, but so is one portion of an individual machine. The granularity of the respective
entities and activities under investigation in an experiment will vary according to the
scope of the experimenter’s inquiry. Using this approach, the experimenter tailors the
experimental design to the mechanism in question.
We see the very same approach to mechanisms in biology: the nesting of mecha-
nisms in biology is particularly akin to the nesting of systems in computing. For
example, an ecosystem is comprised of individual organisms, just as a network is
comprised of individual machines. Likewise, an individual organism is comprised of
unique organs which work together to permit the organism to function, just as an
individual machine is comprised of unique components which work together to permit
the machine to function. Experimentation in biology may isolate a mechanism at the
ecosystem level, the organism level, the organ level, or still other levels of granularity.
Similarly, experimentation in computing may isolate a system at the network level, the
machine level, the component level, or still other levels of granularity.
Furthermore, biological mechanisms operate regularly owing to their physical
grounding. This permits prediction. The desire for predictive power has not gone
unnoticed in the cybersecurity domain: Maxion, Longstaff, and McHugh claim that
“prediction is the key result that we want from scientific research” (Maxion et al. 2010,
p. 2). When restricting our scope to physical computing mechanisms, we see that such
prediction is attainable owing to the assurance that the mechanisms in question operate
regularly over large stretches of time.18 In both biology and computing, the regular
17 The addition for clarity is bracketed.
18 A possible exception occurs in the case of networks, which operate based upon engineered control
components (the code). Experimentation that isolates that code might not involve a physical mechanism of
the sort under consideration in this section.
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operation of mechanisms offers the capability for prediction, a quality valued in both
domains.
Given the similarities between physical computing mechanisms and biological
mechanisms, it is reasonable to expect that we could obtain guidance for reputable
scientific experimentation on physical mechanisms in computing through studying the
methodology employed in an established science such as experimental biology. To that
end, we next seek a set of qualities that experimenters in computing could use to
strengthen the foundation upon which their experimental endeavors are built.19
To begin the task of extracting desiderata that are already at work in reputable
experimental research in biology, consider an arbitrary research experiment chosen
from a recent issue of The Journal of Experimental Biology.20 In the experiment,
researchers sought to discover the mechanism for seafaring birds’ ability “to
pinpoint their breeding colony even within an apparently featureless environment”
(Gagliardo et al. 2013). That the experimenters take the mechanistic approach
outlined in Sect. 2 is apparent immediately. The second sentence of the article’s
abstract reads: “The mechanisms underlying their surprising navigational perfor-
mance are still unknown” (Gagliardo et al. 2013, p. 2798). The experiment is
thereby designed to isolate the physical mechanism that results in successful
navigation for the birds.
The article is broken into three sections (“Materials and Methods,” “Results,”
and “Discussion”).21 Within the “Materials and Methods” section, the authors note
that over the course of two separate trial runs of 24 birds each, 8 birds were
equipped to determine whether magnetic-sensing entities in the brain were the
primary operators in the mechanism, 8 birds were equipped to determine whether
olfactory entities in the nose were the primary operators, and 8 birds were untreated
as a control measure. These choices were made in accordance with previous
research that demonstrated that the leading candidates for the mechanism are
magnetic navigation and olfactory navigation.22 These settings for the experiment
speak directly to the experimenters’ desire to control independently for the two
potentially existing variables in the mechanism under scrutiny. (In this case, the
variables are entities, but they may be activities in other experimental structures.)
Thus, we see that one desideratum is internal validity:
19 An alternative approach to the one being taken here might involve straightforwardly listing and adopting the
principles already accepted as standards in experimental biology. A good introduction to those principles is
provided in Weber (2012), especially Sect. 3. However, our intention is to provide a starting point from which
computing might refine and develop its own set of principles. Accordingly, we believe that the better approach
(as conveyed in the following) is to identify a core set of properties from a traditional science (in this case,
biology), from which computing-specific principles can be developed. In this way, computing would benefit
from the methodology of the established sciences without being wholly restricted to properties and principles
that have already been tailored to the established sciences in question.
20 The arbitrariness of the choice is deliberate, as will be addressed. The strategy is to provide the reader with a
specific example for clarity while, at the same time, noting some general features of scientific experimentation
in the field of biology.
21 There is an opening “Introduction” section that chiefly introduces the subject material and lightly describes
the experiment, but the details are included in the subsequent sections, making the “Introduction” dispensable
for the current analysis.
22 The references for the previous research leading to these two candidates were provided in the “Introduction”
section by the authors.
450 E. Hatleback, J.M. Spring
Internal validity: the mechanism under experimentation is of suitable scope to
achieve the reported results; the entities and activities of the experimental mech-
anism are not susceptible to systematic error.
An experiment can lack internal validity in two ways. First, it may be the case that
too many entities or activities are unknown. Second, the granularity of the experimental
mechanism might not match the granularity of the desired result.23 In either situation,
the experiment’s result would not be sufficient to clarify the mechanism under scrutiny.
Also within the “Materials and Methods” section, the authors note the precise details
of the birds implemented in the experiment:
During the 5 days prior to the experiment the colony was monitored daily, to
check whether the incubating individuals had been relieved by their partner
during the previous night. Only those individuals that had returned to the colony
during the last two nights before the experiment were captured. This was done in
order to displace only birds that were highly motivated to return to the nest, and
with presumably no or low motivation to forage: indeed, after returning to the
nest to relieve its partner during incubation, a bird normally fasts during the 7–
10 days it spends on its egg. (Gagliardo et al. 2013, p. 2799)
This procedure speaks to a second desideratum. Not only were actual members of
the “wild” subjects used; they were chosen with forethought that ensured that the
experimental mechanism would be faithful to the nonexperimental mechanism. Had
they chosen birds that potentially needed to forage, it would be unclear whether the
navigational mechanism observed in the experiment would represent the navigational
mechanism “in the wild.” This speaks to the experiment’s external validity:
External validity: the mechanism under experimentation (and therefore the result
of the experiment) is not solely an artifact of the laboratory setting; the experi-
mental mechanism is faithful to the mechanisms “in the wild.”
The careful selection of subjects outlined in the passage above also contributes to a
third desideratum. The need for food could have been a pre-mechanism cause that
confounded the experimental results, since birds foraging for food are likely to use the
navigation mechanism (or perhaps an entirely different mechanism) to hunt for food
rather than use the targeted navigational mechanism to return to the colony.
Additionally, careful notes throughout the “Materials and Methods” section detail the
postexperimental consequences as safe for the subjects. Examples include the facts that
the eggs of the captured birds that needed incubating were replaced with plaster eggs to
prevent confusion in the colony, that the real eggs were incubated properly until the
conclusion of the experiment, and that the nasal wash used to eliminate the olfactory
cues of the birds had an effective duration of only a few weeks before complete
functionality returned (Gagliardo et al. 2013, p. 2799). These factors all speak to the
containment of the experiment:
23 An example of this sort of “granularity mismatch” might involve trying to acquire experimental results
about interaction at the cellular level with an experimental mechanism at the ecosystem level.
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Containment: no pre-mechanism causes threaten to confound the results, and no
postmechanism effects are a threat to safety.
Finally, within the “Results” section, the reader can find a complete account of the
experiment’s outcome and how those results contribute to understanding the mecha-
nism under investigation. In this case, the provided results yield strong support for the
hypothesis that the navigational mechanism includes olfactory entities as necessary
pieces of the mechanism. It is here, and within the ensuing “Discussion” section, that
the experiment’s contribution toward understanding the mechanism is detailed. Explicit
discussion of the results contributes transparency to the experiment, since such discus-
sion contributes to the completeness of the diagram for the mechanism under study.
Optimal transparency for the mechanism under investigation is sought throughout the
report. Accordingly, a fourth desideratum is transparency:
Transparency: there are no explanatory gaps in the experimental mechanism; the
diagram for the experimental mechanism is complete.
Transparency involves clarity in describing the experimental mechanism’s parameters.
Without that clarity, the experiment will not be capable of replication or reproduction.
Lest the reader think that the specific article under consideration is unique, the
research articles in The Journal of Experimental Biology each contain precisely the
same named sections: “Introduction,” “Results,” “Materials and Methods,” and
“Discussion.”24 This serves to maintain a standard level of scientific reputability, both
for the journal and for the discipline. Likewise, the structure serves to avoid violation of
the desiderata (internal validity, external validity, containment, and transparency)
identified in the case study presented here.25
3.2 Case Study: Cybersecurity
In contrast to the standardized approach in experimental biology, the experimental
literature in cybersecurity stands in need of scientific direction. There is no standard
format for reporting experimental results.26 Indeed, upon selecting what appears to be
the most replicable experiment from among the publications in the 2013 IEEE
24 This can be verified by inspecting the articles published in the journal. At the time of this publication, the
journal’s recent (and current) research articles all exhibit these distinct sections. Furthermore, the submission
policies for 2014 note a switch in the presentation order of the “Materials and Methods” section and the
“Discussion” section: the “Discussion” section now appears before the “Materials and Methods” section. This
is strong evidence for the necessary inclusion of these sections in all research article submissions.
25 Surely other experimental virtues are striven for in experimental biology; we do not intend for the set to be
interpreted as exhaustive. Instead, the intent is to identify a strong, uncontroversial set of desiderata that
cybersecurity (as a case study from computing) could benefit from adopting. As will be described in Sect. 3.2,
if this core set were widely adopted in cybersecurity (and suitably adjusted), it would contribute a great deal to
the cybersecurity literature on experimentation.
26 See, for example, the full set of proceedings from the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
which is one of the most prestigious conferences (and publications) in the field of cybersecurity. The articles,
even though they appear within the same publication, admit of no similarities in structure to each other save for
the inclusion of an “Introduction” section within each contribution.
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Symposium on Security and Privacy, attempts to complete the replication have been
met with great difficulty.27
The foregoing suggests that a legitimate starting point might involve reformulating
the four desiderata in place for biological experimentation for use in the cybersecurity
domain. For example, adding security concerns to the Containment desideratum would
tailor its application to cybersecurity while retaining the methodological clout that the
desideratum delivers to methodology in experimental biology. Other minor adjustments
could be imparted to the desiderata as needed to tailor them to the various subdisci-
plines of computing. Doing so would contribute to the scientific respectability of
cybersecurity and the other subfields of computing.
Some recognize the state of disrepute of published experimental work in the
cybersecurity field. For example, Roy Maxion and his colleagues have several
contributions in the literature that urge for the adoption of standard experimental
practices from traditional sciences.28 The experimentation with biometric security
measures performed by Kevin Killourhy and Maxion is particularly noteworthy
(Killourhy and Maxion 2009). In that study, the physical mechanism involved
with keystroke dynamics receives experimental attention. Furthermore, the study
meets all four of the outlined desiderata: equipment capable of capturing the
needed measurements and a series of algorithms were used to assess the data
(internal validity); the subjects were varied in age, gender, and handedness
(external validity); the apparatus measured only the keystrokes entered during
the trials and ceased after a successful run, and the experimental design did not
harm the human subjects (containment); and Killourhy and Maxion detail each
entity and activity involved in the experimental setup (transparency).29 They also
publish further details and the complete set of collected data on a website so that
it may be analyzed by any who wish to do so.
Like Killourhy and Maxion, Christian Rossow and colleagues have argued for
an overhaul in experimental practice, but in the malware research subfield. 30
Rossow and his colleagues identify a general failure of sound experimental
method—what they label a lack of “prudence”—in the published literature.
Specifically, they champion a four-pronged approach to good experimental de-
sign: correctness (the use of good datasets), transparency, realism, and safety.
After assessing a sample of 36 recent publications in the literature, they make the
following claims:
27 We use “replicate” in the sense distinguished by Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright 1991): to perform as closely
as possible the experiment’s original procedures with the aim of acquiring the same results. Along with
Alexander Rodriguez, we have been attempting to replicate the experiment performed by Yinglei Wang and
colleagues presented in “Hiding Information in Flash Memory” (Wang et al. 2013). Even after acquiring from
them the very device that they used in their original experiment, we have been unable to run the experiment
from the information they provide in their publication. Subsequent correspondence with the authors for clarity
also has failed to mitigate the problem. Further details may be presented in a future publication once the
research is complete.
28 See, for example, Maxion et al. (2010) and Killourhy and Maxion (2011).
29 See Killourhy and Maxion (2009) for details.
30 Because malware research heavily engages engineering, this case provides good evidence that even
experimentation targeting engineered mechanisms in computing might benefit from adopting the methodology
of established sciences. That stronger claim would require further argumentation that may be pursued in future
work.
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At least nine (25 %) distinct papers appear to suffer from clearly significant
problems relating to our three most basic correctness criteria … Descriptions of
experimental setups lack detail to ensure repeatability … [and] the majority of
papers incompletely describe experimental results … Only a minority of papers
includes real-world evaluations, and very few papers offer significant sample
sizes … Most papers did not deploy or adequately describe containment. More
than two thirds (71 %) completely omit treatment of any containment potentially
used during the experiments. (Rossow et al. 2012, pp. 71–73)
They conclude that malware experimentation currently does not meet the acceptable
standards of scientific respectability.
The four-pronged “prudence” approach to malware experimentation advocated by
Rossow et al., reduces to careful assessment of the experimental mechanism.
“Correctness,” or the use of good data sets, ensures that the results of the experiment
conform to the “regularity” feature described by Machamer, Darden, and Craver:
without good data sets, the experiment would not reveal a mechanism that works
“the same way under the same conditions,” because the mechanism would be corrupted
by a feature that would not necessarily manifest itself during a future experimental run.
Correctness, therefore, is an instantiation of internal validity. “Transparency,” which
lends repeatability and comprehensibility to the experimental setup, amounts to ensur-
ing that no “explanatory gaps” exist in conveying the experiment’s design. This is in
accord with the transparency desideratum described in Sect. 3.1. “Realism,” as de-
scribed by Rossow et al., correlates directly with the external validity desideratum: it
involves making sure that the experiment involves malware, operating systems, net-
work presence, and stimuli that will accurately replicate situations that occur outside of
the experimental mechanism. Lastly, “safety” involves controlling the set up and
conclusion conditions of the experiment in such a way that the experimental mecha-
nism cannot inadvertently be efficacious of (potentially harmful) consequences outside
the experiment. That makes safety a correlate of the containment desideratum.
We see here a clear example of computing (in this case study, cybersecurity)
potentially benefitting from adopting the methodology of an established science (in
the case study depicted here, biology). We suspect that the example can be extended to
other subfields of computing. For example, an inquiry that attempts to determine the
scalability or stability of a system—whether it be the Internet, a large cloud infrastruc-
ture, or a consumer gaming platform—must deal with similar questions involving
internal validity, external validity, containment, and transparency in order to be
accurate, useful, and safe enough to conduct. Additionally, at a general level, the
scientific reputability of the extant experimental research in computing comes into
question largely due to experimental methodology.31 However, in opposition to the
claim made by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, the experimental methodology in
computing can benefit from adopting the principles entrenched in the traditional
sciences.
31 See, for example, Feitelson (2006), Freeman (2008), McCracken et al. (1979), Morrison and Snodgrass
(2011), Vandewalle et al. (2009), Zelkowitz and Wallace (1997), Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998), Denning
(1980), and Tichy (1998) for evidence that experimental shortcomings are the cause for computing’s lackluster
scientific reputation.
454 E. Hatleback, J.M. Spring
As has been argued, adopting the mechanistic approach in conjunction with the
methodology from established sciences may be beneficial for improving experimenta-
tion that isolates physical mechanisms in computing. Such adoption for experimenta-
tion on engineered mechanisms also may be fruitful. However, as will be described in
Sect. 4, engineered mechanisms present special difficulties that warrant consideration
from philosophers of science. Some of the researchers in cybersecurity are beginning to
recognize the advantage of a mechanistic conception of experimental design, and the
argumentation provided in this section has taken the first steps toward justifying the
approach for computing at large.
4 Experimentation on Engineered Mechanisms in Computing
A fundamental assumption in the preceding section was that, when dealing with
physical (natural) mechanisms, their operation is regular, consistent, and unchang-
ing. This assumption is removed when dealing with engineered (artificial) mecha-
nisms: owing to manipulation by rational agents, they may change quickly, with the
same starting conditions leading to different results at the termination of the
mechanism’s operation. Technology’s frequent use of engineered mechanisms
marks a departure from the mechanisms under study in most established sciences.
This makes worthwhile a cursory investigation into technology (and its experimen-
tation on engineered mechanisms) from the perspective of philosophy of science. In
this section, we adopt that perspective, while repeating once more that the following
results represent very early work in exploring the implications for philosophers of
science. To develop this facet of the project to fruition will warrant a separate,
dedicated piece of research. For now, we merely turn to the initial impressions that
might be the seeds of such future research.
Technology enables new action—new activities—that we have not witnessed
before. Experimentation on engineered mechanisms often involves isolating the
activities being performed by the entities in the mechanism, since the physical
pieces of nature (the entities) are typically understood in such cases. 32 The
exploration thus involves understanding what those entities can do. This is
complementary to the standard experimental approach in many physical sci-
ences, such as physics, where the aim is to isolate and study the basic entities
of the world.
For example, Allan Franklin has presented argumentation (on several occasions) for
the different roles that experiment can play for scientists (Franklin 1981; 1990,
Chapter 7; 2012, Section 2). By consolidating those accounts, we can generate the
following list of the roles played by experiment:33
32 An interesting question arises at this juncture concerning the ontological status of some components, such
as software or algorithms, of engineered mechanisms. It is not readily apparent whether code (for example)
should be classified as an entity or an activity, since a piece of code is referred to as an existing thing (i.e.,
entity), but it exists as such insofar as it has capacity to enact some change (i.e., activity).
33 In recent personal communication with Allan Franklin, he suggested a few other roles: exploratory, calling
for a new theory, measuring a quantity of physical interest, enabling, and pursuit. Some of these are
subcategories of the listed roles, and others are still in the developmental stages of description, so we have
restricted the items on the list to only those that feature prominently in the published works.
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1. Theory choice
2. Theory articulation
3. Demonstration that entities involved in our accepted theories exist
4. Measurement of physical quantity
5. Life of its own
Franklin’s list is not a description of stages involved in a single experimental process.
Instead, it is intended to be a set of roles for experimentation whereby any particular
experiment assumes one of the roles on the list. Theory choice involves confirming a
theory, refuting a theory, choosing between theories, or calling for a new theory. Theory
articulation involves stating an existing theoretical dictum in a new way, perhaps
through a formula or law that is gathered from experimental practice. The demonstra-
tion that entities exist needs no further expounding. The measurement of physical
quantities involves correcting misinterpreted results or achieving more accurate mea-
surements, perhaps due to the acquisition of better equipment. The “life of its own”
category is meant to capture the concept of exploratory work or “experimentation for
experimentation’s sake.” It is experimentation that is undertaken independently of
theoretical considerations.
Franklin’s list suggests that philosophers of science tend to focus on the entities
within a mechanism. Categories (1), (2), and (5) involve theoretical considerations.
Only (3) and (4) directly address the experimental mechanism, and both exhibit
emphasis on entities.34
Particularly noteworthy with respect to Franklin’s list is the inclusion of (3) in
conjunction with the noticeable absence of its complementary role, which would be:
6. Demonstration that activities involved in our accepted theories occur.
This role is precisely the role played by many experiments in computing when the
focus is an engineered mechanism. The experimenter wishes to determine whether
some engineered mechanism will act a certain way.
For example, a cybersecurity researcher may wish to determine the mechanism by
which compromised computers in a botnet communicate with their command and
control infrastructure. An instance of the malicious software may be isolated in a
laboratory environment to determine which activities it is capable of employing (direct
IP connection, hard-coded domain name, domain generation algorithm, peer-to-peer,
etc.). Observations must then corroborate which activity is used in actuality on the
Internet. Further, the researcher may wish to refine the description of the activity so as
to detect and isolate it reliably, such as the description of TDL4 botnet peer-to-peer
communication described in Jerrim (2013).
Franklin’s primary research program is experimentation in the physical sciences, so
his emphasis on entities in experimental mechanisms might be expected. Indeed, by
contrast, much experimental work in biology is tailored to discover the activities
34 (4) could perhaps be construed as measuring an activity, but that interpretation would be questionable.
Franklin’s inclusion of the term “physical” suggests that entities are the pieces under measurement. Further,
even if (4) applies to activities, it would refer to the measurement of already-understood activities, rather than
understanding the activities themselves, as occurs in the case of technology.
456 E. Hatleback, J.M. Spring
involved in certain mechanisms. For example, two prominent mechanisms that feature
in the piece by Machamer, Darden, and Craver are the mechanism by which chemical
transmission occurs and the mechanism by which protein synthesis occurs (Machamer
et al. 2000, pp. 8–16). In both cases, the entities involved are broadly understood, but
the task is to understand how the mechanism acts through completion. This further
likeness between computing and biology—both include some experimental mecha-
nisms for which the goal is understanding the mechanism’s activities—further
strengthens the result from Sect. 3. Computing is closely akin to established sciences
in certain ways, so adopting some experimental methodology from those sciences can
be beneficial.
Additionally, however, the reverse has now surfaced: some established sciences are
akin to computing in certain ways, so philosophers of science might stand to benefit
from investigating the likeness. The preceding suggests that philosophers of science
might obtain methodological clarity by splitting the roles for experiment accordingly
and including (6) among the roles. Analysis of engineered mechanisms in computing
may reveal further work for philosophers of science, as well. The intrinsic susceptibility
of engineered mechanisms to change might offer such an opportunity. In that case, the
analysis might, for example, result in the emergence of a desideratum specifically
addressing the acceptable level of manipulation (if any) of the engineered mechanism
under experimental consideration. In these ways (and almost certainly others, as well),
the “regularity” (or lack thereof) of engineered mechanisms offers philosophers of
science the possibility for novel research opportunities.35
The established mechanistic approach includes an ontology of entities and activities.
The aim of a properly constructed scientific experiment is to isolate either an entity or
an activity within a mechanism so that it can be identified or understood. Attempting to
do more within a single experiment introduces confounding factors that may cast doubt
upon the experiment’s results. Further analyses of the mechanistic approach to exper-
imentation in computing, in addition to a deeper analysis of the implications that have
been suggested in this section, might reveal additional hitherto unidentified roles for
experiments, but such analyses must be left to future research.
5 Concluding Remarks
A promising hint of correspondence emerges from the preceding narrative.
Mechanisms are comprised of entities and activities. Computing admits of experimen-
tation on physical mechanisms and engineered mechanisms. A mechanistic approach to
experimentation in computing shows that researchers in computing stand to benefit by
adopting methodology from established sciences, especially when the experimentation
targets a physical mechanism. Likewise, philosophers of science stand to benefit from
studying the implications of the mechanistic approach for experimentation in comput-
ing. Experimentation in some sciences admits of the same conceptual split between
entity-focused experimentation and activity-focused experimentation that is inherent in
35 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the difficulty encountered by an experimenter when faced
with the potential irregularities that might emerge while designing an experiment that targets an engineered
mechanism.
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computing. Accordingly, detailed study of experimentation on engineered mechanisms,
which often involves an activity-focused approach, could be fruitful for philosophers of
science.36
Thus, the argumentation provided by Schiaffonati and Verdicchio pays dividends.
Refining their “engineering” insight shows that computing often involves engineered
mechanisms. Targeting the activities exhibited by such mechanisms is, descriptively,
what many researchers undertake when experimenting. That goal is no less a scientific
undertaking than, for example, the experimentation performed by biologists in their
attempts to understand the activities involved in chemical transmission in synapses. The
mechanistic approach to experimentation in computing provides significant evidence
that computing belongs among the other scientific endeavors. Addressing the potential
practical difficulties involved in adequately describing an engineered mechanism,
which may change while the experimenter is investigating, may be the next step.
However, computing does not have a completely different conceptual framework from
other sciences. Computing can benefit from a mechanistic approach to experimentation.
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